

The Humanistic Turn in Contemporary Islamic Studies

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(Recived: January 23, 2017; Revised: April 12, 2017; Accepted: December 14, 2017)

Abstract

One of the first concerns of the thinkers was to know the human. Muslim thinkers also have had a great deal of effort to offer a comprehensive theory and viewpoint about the human. This article is a secondary study about the patterns of Muslim thinkers to know the human and it compares the Ṣadrian pattern with the Neoṣadrian one. It does not aim at judging the content of these patterns; it investigates the principles of the structural turn of Neoṣadrians in the contemporary Islamic studies. Ṣadrian anthropology is of the kind of philosophical psychology, though it has many differences with earlier philosophical viewpoints. Although contemporary Shī‘a thinkers are completely influenced by the Ṣadrian theosophy in their ontology and theology, they are faced with a revolutionary change of content and structure in the issue of human which shows an anthropological turn. Both the subject of matter and the principles and theorems are developed in this turn. The root of this turn is the attention of the Neoṣadrian to the philosophy of humanities and the anthropological basics of behavioral and social sciences. In the second part, the essential teachings of Islam about the human as the Islamic anthropology principles and in the third part, the theoretical principles of contemporary anthropology are investigated.

Keywords

Anthropology, Philosophical psychology, The theory of corporeal creation, The theory of natural disposition, The theory of arbitraries.

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Introduction

Trying to know the human is considered as one of the oldest theoretical concerns of the mankind, because the human has always been seeking his origin, and due to this he has made many myths and stories. Historically, the world of West has passed four periods in regard to the “Humanistic view”: the mythical, philosophical, Christian, and scientific periods. The expression “anthropology” as a scientific field was common for the first time in English speaking countries at the beginning of the twentieth century so that they could study those societies known as primitives through ethnomethodology. The expression “ethnology” also at the beginning of the twentieth century mainly meant the exclusive study of primitive societies, clans, tribes and etc., but now, it also includes broader domains. Nonetheless, “Theory of Human” in Islamic studies discusses the way of human genesis and beginning, his destiny and fate and his status in the system of being. Since human is a very complicated creature and has different existential dimensions and aspects, so exploring and researching about all of them seems something impossible in one scientific field, so different sciences investigate the diverse human dimensions and aspects. Meanwhile, some questions have a more basic role and, in fact, they depict a macro image of the human. In depicting this macro image, thinkers generally have used four ways: philosophy, mysticism, overgeneralizations of experiences, and the transmitted teachings of religions. Through the rational method, “Philosophical Psychology” explores the general truth of the human which it calls it “self”. Based on the witnesses of the mystics, mystical anthropology attempts to study the “perfect human” and the experience in this path. In addition to anthropology in a particular sense which is a field of study next to other humanities, behavioral and social schools in the experimental sciences suppose metaphysical viewpoints towards the human. There are many transmitted teachings about the human in the verses and Islamic narrations, some of which relate general and macro rules about the human. In theorizing, Muslim thinkers have more or less used the threefold way of philosophy, tradition, and mysticism and even quasi-

experimental rules which are the result of generalizing their biological experiences; however, their theorizing about the human generally can be subsumed in the framework of “Philosophical Psychology”, and in spite of the mention of many qur’ānic and traditional instances and being inspired through mystical teachings even in the Ṣadrian theosophy, the structure of these discussions are still “psychological”. However, in the contemporary Islamic studies which are turned structurally by the views of Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, anthropology issues are developed beyond the issues of the psychology. This research plan is called “Neoṣadrian viewpoint”.

In this article, we answer this question that what differences are between the Neoṣadrian viewpoint¹ and the Ṣadrian psychology. After

¹ The title of Neoṣadrian is loosely attributed to Iranian contemporary thinkers that all of them have accepted the major principles of Ṣadrian theosophy and try to use this legacy to answer the new challenges, specially the philosophy of humanities. Among the thinkers that are remembered as Neoṣadrian, like thinkers in other schools of thought, there are disagreements in ideas and interpretations that should be noted in studying an issue, but usually in the secondary studies commonalities and collaborations of affiliate individuals of a thinking trend are more taken into account. It is usual to mention Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī as the founder and the harbinger of this trend (Rashād, 1999: 60-62), but in other articles the correspondent author of this article will discuss the structural differences of Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s humanistic pattern with his Neoṣadrian students. The author presupposes about the Neoṣadrians that these thinkers are very much in debt to their masters, Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Imām Khomeinī, in their main ideas, as in this article also the effect of two macro theories “natural disposition” and “arbitraries” are discussed. However, these students agree more than their masters with the principles of Ṣadrian theosophy and try to bring their masters’ views and the Ṣadrian theosophy together, whereas their masters limit philosophy to the discussion of facts. “So nothing designs something else unless that thing is an external existence and real being and is not an illusion and imagination—need directs us towards a discussion about the existent things and the differentiation of those things through entity properties derived from things that are not existent, and this discussion obviates the doubt and leads to certainty. So this way of discussion directs us towards the reality of things due to their reality.” (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996: 3). To him, the discussion of arbitraries and the philosophy of human affairs is a consequent of these considerations and the discussion of self as a philosophical reality is not a humanistic discussion. In this regard, Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī cannot be considered a philosopher with minor disagreements with the Ṣadrian theosophy, and

explaining the difference between these two viewpoints in the “Subject of Matter”, it is shown in this article that this difference has roots in the “intention” of studying the human in these two viewpoints. The major intention of the Şadrian theosophy regarding the psychology is to answer divine issues, especially the issue of the hereafter, while the major intention of the Neoşadrians regarding the “Humanistic view” is related to the philosophy of behavioral and social sciences. In the second and the third parts of the article, the basics of the Neoşadrian viewpoint are discussed in regard to its transmitted teachings and macro theories.

Structural differences of Şadrian psychology and Neoşadrian anthropology

In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, the pillars of a science and figure include “subject of matter”, “principles”, and “theorems”. Based on “logical pattern of science”, differentiations of sciences depend on the differentiation of their subjects and every science unites with its subject (Fārābī, 1987: 307-326; Ibn Sīnā, 1985: 95; Ṭūsī, 1997: 393; Hillī, 2009: 326-329). Based on this pattern, every science talks about the essential accidents of subject and can be proved based on “principles”. Principles are also of assumptions and admitted opinions in which science cannot be proved.

The subject of psychology and anthropology

In its humanist view, transcendent theosophy theorizes philosophically about the “self”, that is, the subject of humanistic view in Şadrian theosophy is the “self”, but the subject of humanistic view in Neoşadrian viewpoint is the concrete reality of “human” which includes the self as well.

To Plato, “self is the origin of the life of body and its movement” (Plato, 2001: vol. 4: 2357). Based on dividing the composite creatures into inorganic and organic, Aristotle considers the self as the first perfection for the organic natural body (Aristotle, 1987, second volume,

so he is Neoşadrian.

78). In this definition, perfection means something that species in its nature or attributes can be completed by it and first perfection completes the nature of species (Fayyādī, 2010: 33). By mentioning that self “is everything that is the origin for the procession of acts that are not uniform, so it is called self” (Ibn Sīnā, 2006: 12), Ibn Sīnā brought together the two aforementioned definitions, because if the agent is without will and like stone and wood has uniform acts, its specific form is no longer called self. Self is the origin of willful and non-uniform acts. Ibn Sīnā has discussed the self in the natural sciences of *Shifā* and he himself stipulates this point (Ibn Sīnā, 2006: 21); in explaining the mentioned definition, Mullā Ṣadrā has precisely related all materials of the *Skaykh* (Shīrāzī, 1989, vol. 8: 16-17). However, neither human intuitive knowledge nor inferentially acquired knowledge about the human existence is the meaning of the concrete existence of human which is the subject of the humanistic view in Neoṣadrian viewpoint. Rather, it means the conscionable existence of the human that in addition to being concrete, it implies the impromptu, present existence of the human. That is, every human is comprehended not only through intuitive knowledge and the direct and immediate awareness of the mental form but also it is comprehended, after the intuitive knowledge, through the acquired knowledge derived from the intuitive knowledge. This type of acquired knowledge is the terminologically called the intuitive cognition or conscientious knowledge (Khusru Panāh, 2010: 345). When we discuss the concrete existence of the human, the discussion of human reality and quiddity and his acts are put forward as an issue. In other words, “human self” is one of the issues of Neoṣadrian anthropology, while in the philosophical psychology the quiddity of the self is the subject of the science and the subject of a science is not a part of the issues of that science.

The relation of Ṣadrian psychology and Neoṣadrian anthropology with the Qur’ān and narrations

Although Ṣadrian theosophy and Neoṣadrian thinking agree in their resources of knowledge and talk about the convergence of Qur’ān, reason, and mysticism (Shīrāzī, 1989, vol. 8: 303; Ṭabāṭabā’ī, *Risālah*

al-wilāyah, the memoir of the great interpreter Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1982: 11), they differ in the use pattern and the combinations of those resources in anthropology. In Ṣadrian theosophy contrary to earlier philosophers, although psychology is transferred from natural sciences to theology and Mullā Ṣadrā is inspired by transmitted teachings and mystic revelations, it theorizes about the human based on philosophical reasoning. Neoṣadrian thinkers pay attention to the efforts of Mullā Ṣadrā in psychology and do not reject these contemplations fundamentally; however, main ideas of Neoṣadrians about the human are derived from the interpretation of the Qur'ān and narrative teachings, the most important of which will be taken into account in the second part of the article. The most important "theorem" in Ṣadrian psychology is the theory of corporeal creation and its ramified theorems, but in Neoṣadrian anthropological pattern, in addition to corporeal creation theory, other macro theories are also attractive which will be discussed in the third part. But why have Neoṣadrians developed subject and principles this much in studying the human?

Aims of humanistic view

Knowing existential dimensions of the human can be discussed from different aspects and dimensions. The discussion of "human from the viewpoint of Islam" sometimes refines some introductions of the discussions of prophethood and the hereafter in the discussion of doctrinal system, sometimes comes next to ontology, epistemology, and axiology to make up the basics of Islamic thinking, and sometimes refines in these discussions the anthropological premises of humanities like social sciences, economic system, management, education system and etc.

The main goal of Muslim philosophers in the discussions of psychology has been the extraction of conceptual and affirmative principles to explain philosophically the hereafter and the reality of human bliss and affliction. Of course, these discussions are also used in explaining the medical opinions, but often the premise of discussions of the hereafter has been used to nullify the reincarnation and explain the spiritual and corporeal hereafter (Ibn Sīnā, 2004: 114-191; Shīrāzī,

2002: 360-433).

The “application” of the discussions of self, particularly evil-prompting faculties and the role of intellect, anger, and lust in ethical discussions are taken into account in the works of Muslim thinkers (Feīd Kāshānī, 2007; Narāqī, 1996; Khumeinī, 1999). This type of attention has been increased in the works of Neoşadrians and, in addition to ethics, its application has got attention in the training system as well. Less attention was paid to the relation between anthropology and prophethood, but Neoşadrians pay attention to this relation and propose anthropological premises in theological and doctrinal discussions (Muṭahharī, 2008; Id., 2000; Mişbāḥ Yazdī, 1997).

However, the most important and distinctive feature of Neoşadrian thinkers which caused the subject and the range of anthropological theorems to develop beyond psychology was that these thinkers have paid attention to “Humanistic foundations of humanities, ideologies, and social schools”. This has been the root of their selection and arrangement of anthropological discussions. First, it has caused the subject to go beyond the “self” and second, in contrary to the works of earlier scholars that explored the personal dimension of the human, it has caused them to describe and analyze both personal and social dimensions of life, because these basics have a direct connection with social philosophy and thinking, axiology, and economic system (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2003; Muṭahharī, 2003; Id., 1997; Id., 2005; Jawādī Āmulī, 2006; Id., 2008; Mişbāḥ Yazdī, 1999; Id., 2001; Id., 2009; Khusru Panāḥ; 2003). It is the role of Humanistic foundations in the inquisitive sciences in philosophy of behavioral and social sciences that has got the attention of Neoşadrian thinkers. Later in this article, we will discuss two main resources of humanistic opinions of Neoşadrian thinkers.

Necessities of Islamic anthropology

To Muslim thinkers, especially Neoşadrians, the best way to know the human is a combinatory pattern of tradition, reason, experience, and intuition and the yardstick in cases of disagreement is the reliance on

necessary teachings and revealed texts, because the reality of the human is like a book that is in need of explanation and the interpreter of this book cannot be anybody except its writer, i.e. its lord and creator. In narrative anthropology, origin and hereafter as two important parts take into account the human existence and his life relationships and its goal is the effect of these teachings in taking the human towards bliss and perfection. Regarding the different levels of thinkers and the probability of making mistakes in thoughts and in spite of using the tradition, reason, experiences, and intuitions, in fact, Islamic anthropology can lead to different patterns and models. Nonetheless, some teachings have a pivotal role in these patterns and theories and, in other words, they are necessities that every theory about the human from the viewpoint of Islam should be congruent with and should explain.

A) Human need for religion. *The most important question in human philosophy is the goal of human creation and the way of his reaching. The claim of revealed religions is that this question cannot be answered only with reliance on the teachings of self-founded intellect and the order of human life is in need of the prophets' mission and God's legal guidance. Of course, intellect can independently understand this point and can allege reasons for the need of the human for religion. The issue of Prophets' mission can be simply proved by intellectual reason. If we prove it with verses, narrations, and narrative reasons, the implausible problem can be solved. Of course, it is possible to derive different aspects of prophets' mission and to pose intellectual reasons from verses and narrations.*

B) The worldly and otherworldly life of human. *The Hereafter and otherworldly life is one of the facts that true believers, especially Muslims, believe in it. Hereafter is the transfer from this world to the other world and the change of worldly life to otherworldly life, and it is the return from this world to the other world. This doctrine has many humanistic requirements. Based on this idea, human has an everlasting life, so his life is infinite. Also, the*

creation of the human is futile and hereafter and ultimate life is the goal of human life.

C) *Human volition and responsibility.* *Despite different overt and esoteric interpretations of it, the other doctrine which is counted as one of the essentials of Islam is the human volition and responsibility, because the logic of Islam and the expression of legal duties of existence is a field of human volition, though different sects may be diverse in expressing the extent and range of this volition. This principle expresses that human is a creature created by God that is responsible for his acts through thinking, free will and volition and can form his own worldly and otherworldly life and his personal and social life. It is based on this that he is also addressed for legal duties. Of course, this basic principle has been greatly misunderstood.*

D) *The role of faith and practice in human bliss and affliction.* *Based on the two previous doctrines, the ultimate bliss or affliction of human is made through his volition. All Muslims believe in the role of faith and good practice in bliss. Of course, some have gone extreme and consider mere claim of faith sufficient for bliss and undermine too much the role of good deeds, like Deferrers in Umayyad time and Dervishes in present time. Contrary to this, some like Kharijites appeared that valued the act to that extent that they said committing a grave sin is blasphemy, or like some intellectuals who ask about the bliss of those inventors who have not had faith. For salvation and immunity from the punishment of God, three conditions are mentioned: (1) faith in God, (2) belief in the resurrection day, and (3) good deed (Muṭahharī, 2001: 255-271).*

Anthropological macro theories in Neoşadrian theosophy

As we said, the main part of Neoşadrian ideas about the human is the explanation and interpretation of verses and narrations, but this explanation and interpretation is based on an intellectual-philosophical image that this image itself, of course, has been inspired by the narrative teachings at a macro level. In exploring these ideas,

three macro theories are discernible: (1) it is the theory of corporeal creation of self and its ramified theorems. Although this theory is not that much stipulated, it constitutes the main part of “human ontology” in Neoşadrian thinking, (2) the theory of natural disposition in which philosophical, mystical, and qur’anic roots are way intertwined and Neoşadrians talk much about natural perceptions, tendencies, and insights, though they have not been made completely coherent and refined, and (3) it is the theory of arbitraries which is introduced by Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and has a huge capacity to analyze human acts, but its application generally has received attention in the philosophy of ethics.

Theory of corporeal creation of self

Although the discussions of philosophical psychology have their roots in the works of Aristotle, they have got a new face in the thoughts of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. In Neoşadrian psychology, due to its ontological principles, particularly existentialism, gradation of being, proof of the world of forms, multiple existence of essence, and substantial movement, a new image of self is provided whose main manifestation is in the theory of “corporeal creation of self” and many novel ideas of Mullā Ṣadrā are the ramified theorems of this theory.

The reasons that prove the self want to show that it is not possible to depreciate the vital behaviors to the bodily features of inanimate things like nature and corporeal form. Those discussions that prove the incongruence of self with body and temper discuss this point (Bahmanyār, 1996: 725-728). In this viewpoint, the rational self is a substantial reality which is inherently abstract. Mullā Ṣadrā agrees with Ibn Sīnā about the abstraction of self, but he holds that the abstraction essential to the self is an ideal abstraction and not an intellectual abstraction (Shīrāzī, 1962: 243). Also regarding the abstraction, he disagrees with Ibn Sīnā in the way of the creation of the self and considers its creation corporeal.

It is claimed about the corporeal creation of the self that the reality we have called the “human self” has been a corporeal thing, material mediated, and reliant on the body, in a way that without the body it had

no possibility of existence and then has become abstract and is no longer reliant on the body and can live without it (Shīrāzī, 1989, vol. 8: 333-334). Its difference with previous ideas is that the abstract self is non-existent before the creation and it is created with appearance of a capable body from the first moment of creation in the form of an abstract substance, but Mullā Ṣadrā considers the reality of the present abstract self an alteration of the previous corporeal thing (Ibid.: 38, 148 & 326). To explain this theory, Mullā Ṣadrā resorts to the intensified substantial movement of self. Based on this, self is a continuous substantial reality with assumed parts that are created one after the other consecutively and every part creating a superior existence is itself a wasted existence (Shīrāzī, 2002, vol. 2: 446-447).

The totality of this theory with some additional notes and modifications is accepted by Neoṣadrians and has got the attention for solving the problems of ontology about the human; however, the main framework of Neoṣadrians' anthropological ideas is not based on this theory. The most important implications of this theory can be seen in human ontology, particularly the relation of self and body and the quiddity of biological mechanisms, but its implications in the discussion of growth and personality also can be regarded in the theoretical bases of behavior. Some of the reasons of this theory can be taken into consideration in Neoṣadrian thinking; in spite of this, there are more implications for it to be applied in personal and social philosophy.

Theory of natural disposition

From the previous centuries, Islamic scholars sporadically have discussed the relation of natural disposition and monotheism and the knowledge, and references can be found in the works of Muslim thinkers about the natural deism or the relation of natural disposition and training and so on, though in recent century the discussion of natural disposition between theologians and Shi'a philosophers has got so many fans and also many works are published in this regard. This discussion received special attention through the idea of Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī in considering the belief in God to be natural and its development by Master Muṭahharī in academic and Seminarian

communities. This theory, to Master Muṭahharī, is the most important issue of Islamic knowledge and has an essential role in solving many epistemic problems (Muṭahharī, 63: 2000).

Fitrat (nature) literally means creation, beginning, and invention as it is stated in Arabic language “God created people, created them: created them and began with them, and nature means beginning and inventing” (Ibn Manzūr, 1995: under the word *fiṭr*). This word is derived from the root word *fiṭr* and is based on the *fī ‘lah* mode which implies a particular kind and way, for example *jalasah* means a special kind of sitting or *sīrah* is a special kind of behaving (Muṭahharī, 1995: 455). Terminologically, *fiṭri* (natural) affairs of human are those ones that are within the nature of human and the kind of human creation necessitates them. Based on this theory, human has a series of features and traits that are special to him and cannot be separated from him and human does not need anything out of himself to understand those features and to act according to them (Ibid.: 465). Contrary to psychology, the most original source of this theory is the teachings of the *Qur’ān*, and in regard to this point that the word *fiṭrat* is used for the relation between “special creation of human” and “religion”, this theory has got the attention of interpreters. In this regard, interpreters have paid attention to the interpretation of the verse, “So set thou thy face steadily and truly to the Faith: (establish) God’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by God: that is the standard Religion” (*Qur’ān* 30:30). The most important application of this theory is pursued in theism based on which theism is considered natural (Shāhābādī, 2007: 314-324; Khumeinī, 1999: 180-181; Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2009, vol. 10: 443 & vol. 16: 266-269; Muṭahharī, 1995: 19-34; Jawādī Āmulī, 2007: 36 & 279). This theory is also proposed in eschatology based on which the tendency in human nature for an eternal life is not futile and is considered one of the natural tendencies of human. This claim also is proposed in regard to the origin of religion and human tendency to religion (*Qā’imīnīyā*, 2002: 128). This theory is used for the difference between rationalism and empiricism as well (Khandān, 2004: 52).

In regard to the verse of natural disposition, Shāhābādī proposes

seven points about the natural disposition: (1) natural self- examination, (2) having knowledge about human aspects and ranks, (3) natural origin of religion, (4) natural tendency towards piety and call of nature towards religion, (5) figuring out the reason for the necessity of piety, (6) the reality of servitude and the natural tendency for being true in faith, and (7) the inference of some other affairs like dependency, possibility, submission, hope for God's pleasure, dread of the Creator, and amour propre to be natural (Shāhābādī, 2007: 317). In the explanation of Forty Traditions, Imām Khumeinī has taken his teacher's ideas and considers natural disposition as the origin of human movement and conduct (Khumeinī, 1999: 127).

Based on Jawādī's arrangement, chief theorems of natural disposition theory can be regarded as follows: (1) proving the natural disposition, (2) characteristics of natural disposition, (3) natural knowledge, (4) natural tendencies, (5) outcomes following the natural premises (Jawādī Āmulī, 1386: 21-61). About human nature and that whether the reasons for natural disposition theory result in the unity of nature needs a long and first hand discussion which is beyond the scope of this article, but what is important is the attention that should be paid to the relations of this theory's requirements with the accepted philosophical egology of Neoşadrians. Based on the corporeal creation, human is the child of natural world and as Imām Khumeinī says, "This world is his mother and the love for this world is placed in his heart from the childhood and as he grows, this love also develops" (Khumeinī, 1999: 122), and the possibility of wayfaring to the proximity of God and bliss has roots in natural disposition and the way of his creation.

The theory of arbitraries

The theory of arbitraries is more recognized through the sixth article of the principles of philosophy and the method of Realism as a theory about intuitive knowledge and the philosophy of ethics in the philosophical community (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2000: 385-457). However, this, in fact, is a theory about the principles and requirements of human acts. As it was mentioned in the discussion of volition, the main human

feature is acting in the framework of legal and conventional rules. The chief goal of Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī in the theory of arbitraries is that after introducing the acts of "arbitrarization" and "convention" show how to avoid the flaws stemming from it. Based on this theory, arbitrarization means "granting an attribute of something to another thing that does not have that attribute". For instance, the arbitrary rules that are not originally "necessary" are granted the "necessity" attribute. In the theory of arbitraries, the advantages of arbitrarization are introduced and its flaws are pointed out.

Although this theory was proposed in the scientific and Seminarian communities for the first time in the sixth article of the principles of philosophy, it has not mentioned some points or has proposed some points shortly according to its aims. The first draft of this theory should be looked for in the essays he has written in Najaf and are published in an anthology after his demise (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1983). In six of the seven essays of this anthology, he has discussed arbitraries¹. Based on the chronology of writing these essays, the early motivation for proposing this discussion is a logical concern to avoid fallacy; in the essay of "arbitraries", this analysis is reprocessed and the first assertion on the philosophical analysis of arbitraries is provided, and on behalf of assuming the sameness of interpretations and combinations related to arbitraries with well-known premises, it is changed to this suggestion that arbitraries are considered equivalent to "illusions". Also, the essay of "arbitraries" lays the philosophical groundwork and instruments for discussing and exploring the subject of prophethood which can be seen in the essay "dreams and prophecies" (Mīr Aḥmadī and Yazdānī Muqaddam, 2011: 133-134).

In early works, arbitrarization is proposed about the premises and in the essay "arbitraries", the study of arbitrarization comes to include "meanings" as well, and arbitrary realities are also discussed in the essay "dreams and prophecies". This aspect of the theory is strengthened in the essays "human in the world" and "al-wilāyah", in a way that in the essay "al-wilāyah", the division of creatures into real

¹ composition, analysis, arbitraries, fallacy, reason, and dreams and prophecies

and arbitrary is discussed and the arbitrariness domain is extended to include the illusion, society, and civilization domains when the article addresses the legislations and rules (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 1981: 6). In the principles of philosophy and the method of Realism, a part of these discussions which is related to the appearance of plurality in perception is provided based on which it is attempted to analyze the thoughts which are the basis of perpetuating acts by the human. In *al-Mīzān*, he points out some other aspects of this theory and responds to some doubts and misunderstandings about whether goodness and baseness is relative or not.

As we said, this theory has different dimensions, but the main question about human relation with his acts is where an existential necessity does not trigger his acts, but rather, some acts are arbitrarily considered necessary (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2000: 428-429; *Id.*, 1983: 137-140; *Id.*, 2009, vol. 3: 144-145). This theory claims that the structure of human is in a way that he, to reach ideal perfection, subjectively arbitrarizes his relation with a particular act like “drinking water” – which is in fact a spatial relation – a necessary relation and also assumes that relation necessary and says “I should drink water” (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2000: 453).

After Allāmah, the discussion of arbitrariness has been more about arbitrary perceptions and ethical concepts and it has been less about humanistic dimensions of the theory. However, this drawback has somewhat been obviated in the humanistic works of Master Jawādī Āmulī. This theory can be used to solve many humanistic issues in that this theory particularly pays a special attention to the social aspects of human life and has many reasons for discussions like the relation of the individual with the society and history and the quiddity of human act. Nonetheless, to derive more precise reasons and the applications of this theory in behavioral and social sciences, it is needed to scrutinize and restructure the principles of arbitrariness. Through analyzing the six principles, what is recognized for “arbitrariness” is as follows:

1. Arbitrarization: In the sixth article the principles of philosophy and the method of Realism, he considers “granting the attribute

- of something to something else” as the defining expression of arbitrarization (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2000: 455; Id., 1983: 129).
2. *Arbitrary beings (outcome of arbitrarization):* Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī talks about the arbitrarization and arbitrary meanings in most of his works; however, he stipulates some points in “Risālah al-wilāyah” which are very important. He divides the existence into two parts of real and arbitrary; arbitrary being is “a creature whose external form is logically possible and without logic, it is not possible” (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Risālah al-wilāyah: the memoir of grand interpreter Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1982: first chapter). In other words, arbitrarization causes external arbitrary creatures to become possible. Of course, then he emphasizes that this reasoning is a necessary condition rather than a sufficient one, because existence should be the origin of effect and for this matter, the arbitrary being should have the necessary power (Jawādī Āmulī, 2014, vol. 1: 109). The other point about arbitrary creatures is that they are added-titles that are added to a concrete creature; for example, an individual is a real person that has a real existence, but due to arbitrarization, the title of “director” is added to him and this directorship is an arbitrary existence, and this is one of the points by which arbitraries rely on existences.
 3. *Signifier:* as we said, an arbitrarized is necessary in arbitrarization and also it should be in a position that his arbitrarization be valid and cause the arbitrary creature to be the origin of effect. In some expressions of Allāmah, these arbitrarizations are ascribed to illusion (Ibid.: 116).
 4. *The source of arbitrariness:* in the essay on arbitraries, he calls the special constitution the first perfections and calls the needs removal the secondary perfections, and asserts that the arbitrary thoughts come between the first perfections and secondary perfections and cause the human to reach his secondary perfections (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2000: 399-401; Id., 1362: 123).

5. *The origin of arbitrarization: in the expressions of Allāmah, another interpretation about the source of arbitrarization is also pointed out which we call it the origin of arbitrarization. In every arbitrarization, there is a real matter whose limit is granted to the arbitrary matter that coincides with the arbitrary matter, that is, arbitrarization does not appear unless there is a reality for it (id., 1983: 101 & 131-137). The origin of arbitrarization is the very reality to which the arbitrary matter is applied. This origin is the very real existence to which the new title is credited. That is, a real being exists with some effects and after the credit it finds new effects (id., 1983: the essay of arbitrariness, chapter 2 from the first article: Jawādī Āmulī, 2014, vol. 1: 115).*
6. *The effects of arbitrarization: to Allāmah, arbitrariness are not just impressionable from the outside, but also they themselves create external realities. Directorship is an arbitrary matter, but due to having this directorship, the director attains powers and effects (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2000, 394: Id., 2009, vol. 3: 233-234).*

Relating the arbitrary matters to “thinking about the speculative reason and observing the motivation of practical reason”, Master Jawādī Āmulī divides them into the two types of “reasonable” and “unreal” matters. The arbitrary origin of the reasonable matter is the reason and its result is the satisfaction of the purposes of practical reason, but the arbitrary origin of the unreal matter is lust or anger and its result is the expenditure of human possessions. In other words, the origin and ending of both types are real and existential, but the first type is in line with human ideal bliss, but not the second one (Jawādī Āmulī, 1999: 99). Examples of reasonable arbitrariness include situations where the wise perceive common good and corruption and, to reach those merits and demerits, create specific rules and, to bring about incentives and motivations, use creation and convention.

Conclusion

Explaining human quiddity and its different and complex dimensions has been one of the greatest interests of philosophers of all eras. In the Islamic philosophical tradition, this effort was made in the form of a psychological criticism and study which had been transferred from the philosophy of Greece, while verses and narrations were full of humanistic teachings, some of which were considered religious texts and all Muslim thinkers regarded themselves bound to them.

The attempt to converge these teachings has led to many changes in psychological ideas, in a way that Şadrian psychology with the core of “corporeal creation of self” depicts a totally different image for human psychology. However, in spite of accepting the totality of this theory, contemporary thinkers have essential differences with Şadrian psychology, in a way that we are faced with a structural turn in pattern of human study. The most important difference here is the change of the way of combining the knowledge sources based on which providing narrative evidences for philosophical theories is not important, but rather, verses and narrations are understood and explained under the light of these philosophical theories. In addition to the theory of corporeal creation of self which is a theory with an origin of philosophical anthropology, two macro theories of natural disposition and arbitraries also are used for human understanding and Islamic teachings about the human whose origins are not philosophical psychology. This is one of the most important factors that has caused contemporary humanistic pattern to be away from philosophical psychology and has turned the pattern of human study among the contemporary thinkers.

Nonetheless, the main difference of Neosadrian anthropology with Şadrian psychology that has originated this pattern change is the attention that these philosophers have paid to the new issues, particularly in the basics of systems and humanities schools; studying these issues needs more serious attention towards anthropology.

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