

Acceptance of Guardianship from Tyrant Ruler: The Extraction of Jurisprudential Decree from “Verse 55 of the Joseph Chapter” in Shī‘a and Sunnī Exegeses

Nūshīn Rashīdī Ranjbar^{1*}, Muḥammad Taqī Diyārī Bīdgulī²

1. PhD Holder in the Qur’ānic and Hadīth sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

2. Professor, Department of the Qur’ānic and Hadīth sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

(Recived: June 18, 2019; Revised: December 5, 2019; Accepted: December 15, 2019)

Abstract

The article at hand examines the extraction of the jurisprudential decree on the “Acceptance of guardianship from tyrant ruler” based on the Anecdote Verses of the Qur’ān, especially the noble verse “(Joseph) said: ‘Set me over the store-houses of the land: I will indeed guard them, as one that knows (their importance).’” The Shī‘a political thought, which deems ruling exclusive to God, His Prophet (s), and the Infallible vicegerents of the Prophet (s), has introduced the concept of “guardianship from tyrant ruler” into its political jurisprudence literature from the Major Occultation era and has the biggest share in this discussion. Although the inherent prohibition of cooperation with the tyrant ruler is for sure, the existence of many problems and difficulties in the society and the licenses given by the Pure Imāms (a) to assume certain vacancies in the tyrant governments have led the Shī‘a and Sunnī jurists to deem this type of guardianship as permissible in order to restore the right, promote justice, and execute the Divine Decrees.

Keywords

Anecdote Verses, Ahl al-Bayt (a), Jurisprudential decree, Interpretive narrations, Guardianship from the tyrant ruler.

* Corresponding Author, Email: n.rashidiranjbar@yahoo.com

Introduction

The Shī‘a jurists believe that in the lifetime of the Prophet (s), the legitimate and just ruler is the Prophet (s) himself who is responsible for the execution of decrees and orders. Discussions about the guardianship of the legitimate and just ruler in the jurisprudential texts have been presented about the domains in which the execution of legal decrees depends on the presence and license of the ruler and is within his jurisdiction. The jurisprudential decree on “the license for the acceptance of guardianship from tyrant ruler” is an issue that has found greater importance during the Major Occultation era. The inference of the jurisprudential decree for an issue like “guardianship from the tyrant ruler” from the verse “(Joseph) said: ‘Set me over the store-houses of the land: I will indeed guard them, as one that knows (their importance)’” (Qur’ān 12:55) shows that some Anecdote Verses of the Qur’ān are among the Verses of the Revealed Prescripts and the nature of the qur’ānic anecdotes is not a mere narration of the historical events or stories. At any rate, based on the foregoing verse and the qualities of the Major Occultation era, the presence of tyrant governments in various parts of the world, and the impossibility of changing these political systems and establishing Islamic theocracies based on the Jurist Guardianship theory due to the fact that the Shī‘a are minorities and there is a shortage of human force and facilities, the important question that we come across is that if the Shī‘a can take responsibility in the tyrant governments and accept to supervise and address Muslims’ issues?

There are numerous discussions on this topic in jurisprudential books, including Shaykh Anṣārī’s *Al-Makāsib* (Anṣārī, 1995, vol.2: 54), Imām Khomeinī’s *Makāsib muḥarrama* (Khomeinī, 1978: vol.2: 115), Īrawānī’s *Sharḥ makāsib* (Īrawānī Najafī, 1959: 44), and Āyatullāh Khu’ī’s *Al-Fiqāha* (Khu’ī, 1999, vol. 1: 154).

Definition of terms

Political jurisprudence

“Fiqh” (jurisprudence) literally means understanding and comprehending, and terminologically means having knowledge of legal decrees (Rāghib Iṣfahānī, 1972: 398).

The word “Siyāsāt” (politics) is derived from “sawasa and sāsa”, literally means teaching, training, and supervising the affairs, and terminologically means devising plans for the life, welfare, and economy of the people based on justice and fairness (Khūrī Shartūnī, 1983, under the entry sawasa).

Political jurisprudence then means a set of jurisprudential and legal rules and principles used to organize Muslims’ relationships with themselves and

with other non-Muslims nations based on fairness and justice; it considers the realization of bliss, freedom, and justice to be exclusively due to monotheism in deeds (Shakūrī, 1982: 71).

Wilāyat (guardianship)

Wilāyat (guardianship) is used to mean the nearness of location, the closeness of relationship, religion, honesty, help; the belief in wilāyat is victory, and walāyat is the supervision of affairs (Rāghib Iṣfahānī, 1972: 570).

Wilāyat has been used with this same meaning in the Qur'ān. The Sublime God says, "Your (real) friends are (no less than) Allah, His Messenger, and the (fellowship of) believers, those who establish regular prayers and regular charity, and they bow down humbly (in worship)" (Qur'ān 5:55). This noble verse (along with related narrations) proves that wilāyat belongs to God, the Prophet (s), and Ahl al-Bayt (a). Moreover, the verse "The Prophet is closer to the Believers than their own selves" (Qur'ān 33:6) shows that the wilāyat of the blessed Prophet of Islam (s) over the life and property of the believers is more than their own wilāyat (Jawādī Āmulī, 202: 131).

In some statements of the Infallibles (a), especially in Nahj al-balāgha, the word wilāyat has been extensively used in this meaning. Imām 'Alī (a) says, "So now, Allah, the Glorified, has, by placing me over your affairs, created my right over you" (Nahj al-balāgha, 1988: sermon 216).

Jawr (oppression)

Rāghib says in *Mufradāt*, "The word Jawr is the origin of any deviation from any right, and Jā'ir is one who prevents people from doing what the Divine Law has ordered to be done" (Rāghib Iṣfahānī, 1972: 101).

In *Maqā'īs al-lughā*, this word has been taken to mean deviation from path (Ibn Fāris, 1984, vol. 1: 493).

Moreover, it has been said, "Jawr is oppression and deviation, and Ja'ir ruler is one who has deviated from the path of guidance" (Qurashī, 1973, vol. 1: 89; Ṭurayhī, 1966, vol. 3: 127).

'Allāma writes about the meaning of Jawr, "Jā'ir means a person deviated from the goal who takes his followers to the non-goal and misleads them. Jawr is the misguidance path and has not been made by God, as the path made by God is the purpose and guidance path. However, the Ja'ir's path means deviation from moving in the guidance path; in fact, it is not a true path, but rather, it is a wrong way, and does not lead its wayfarer to God" (Ṭabātabā'ī, 1996, vol. 12: 312).

Wilāyt: The wise rather than the sovereign ruling

The concept of ruling means that the presence of God is the requirement of the human life continuation, and the eternal truth he has put in all creatures is the lawfulness of the universe. As the noble Qur'ān says, "We are nearer to him than (his) jugular vein" (Qur'ān 50:16). God is closer to us than our jugular vein, and his wilāyat (guardianship) and ruling is absolute. However, this wilāyat is accompanied by kindness. One of the names of God is "Wali", which means a supervisor whose wilāyat is accompanied by kindness toward the whole creation; no one other than God has this quality. As a result, God asks in the Qur'ān in an interrogatory manner, "Say: 'Shall I take for my protector any other than Allah, the Maker of the heavens and the earth?'" (Qur'ān 6:14).

In this verse, the legislative guardianship – i.e. God's right for the wise ruling of the society – is mentioned along with the existential guardianship – i.e. managing the whole system of being. It is the kindness and grace of God that creates in the human various needs and wants.

The determination of the qualities and the specification of the conditions for the leadership of the human society depends on knowing the human, which in turn relies on the fact that if the person holds a divine or materialist viewpoint. The divine viewpoint of a thinker and human researcher with a lot of knowledge about the humans has a significant role in the way he looks at the leadership of them.

With regard to the necessity of the existence of a ruler for the continuation and survival of the social life, Imām Riḍā says,

"I can find no group or nation which has survived and continued life unless it has had a unifying leader and [it is because of this that] people have to have a ruler in their religion and worldly life ... To put it better, Imām has used an issue emphasized by thinkers to reject the baseless claim of Khawārij on the lack of need to ruler and government. He has recommended following the same logical reason that asserts that a human society needs a government and a ruler with certain qualities in order to survive and continue its social life."

The question of the necessity of government for the unification of a society is so clear and evident that taking its inevitability for granted, notables such as Ṣāhib Jawāhir have claimed for the necessity of the jurist guardianship (Qāsimī, 2011: 25).

We read in the order of the Commander of the Faithful (a) to Mālik Ashtar, "This religion has formerly been a prisoner in the hands of vicious persons" (Nahj al-balāgha, 1988, letter 53).

Nonetheless, they did not seemingly considered religion separate from politics, as some within the Islamic territory take the sentence “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you [the Prophet’s trustees]” (Qur’ān 4:59) in the same way which is accepted by the ruling party.

The meaning of guardianship from the tyrant ruler

One of the results of the divine leaders’ political maturity is having a profound belief in the divine orders and precisely and confidently putting them into practice. As a result, others’ pressures and threats do not have any influence on them. They are even away from pragmatism and conservativeness.

Imām ‘Alī (a) says, “No one can establish the rule of Allah, the Glorified, except he who shows no relenting (in the matter of right), who does not behave like wrong doers and who does not run after objects of greed.” (Nahj al-balāgha, 1988: saying 110).

In the political jurisprudence, ruling is divided into right and just types. The just government can be fulfilled only by the permission of the Imām of the Era (may God hasten his reappearance), and his deputy is the “just ruler” whose reference is on the one hand the Imām of the Era (may God hasten his reappearance) and on the other hand the jurists who can provide political jurisprudence during the Occultation era; then, these just rulers have to perform the same functions of the Infallible Imāms (a) and have their responsibilities and rights with regard to social affairs. At any rate, the Shī‘a political thought considers the just ruler to be permitted by the Infallible Imām and the religious authority to be the “deputy of Imām” during his Occultation. Therefore, all rulers other than these two are considered as the instances of the “tyrant ruler”, including people who commit any oppression and crime to achieve their personal interests and deprive the Prophet’s nation from a just leader by usurping his position. The main feature of the tyrant ruling is the violation of the dignity of Islam in all respects. Guardianship that comes from a tyrant ruler means accepting any governmental position in which the person should not only approve the ruling body and pursue their goals and intentions, but should also have a share in the oppression afflicted on the nation; distancing from the orders of the noble Prophet (s), he will make the fulfillment of the utopia more difficult and will make the access to justice impossible.

Instances of guardianship from tyrant ruler

The administration of society in issues related to army, municipality, the collection of religious taxes, public taxes, customs, the organization of

weekly or yearly ceremonies such as Friday Prayer or Hajj, and the arrangement of the relationship of the Muslim countries with non-Muslim countries and non-Muslim groups within the tyrant ruler country are the instances of guardianship coming from the tyrant ruler (Shakūrī, 1982: 29).

An example regards the relationship between Safavid kings and Shī'a scholars such as Muḥaqqiq Kurkī, Mīr Dāmād, Shaykh Bahā'ī and his father, Shaykh Ḥurr 'Āmilī, and the first and second 'Allāma Majlisī. This interaction continued from the 10th to the 12th centuries AH for about two and a half centuries.

These scholars used their influence in the Safavid court to promote Shī'a ideology and the oppressed school of Ahl al-Bayt (a), provided it with dignity in the world and prevented its practitioners from suppression, prosecution, and murder by making it the formal religion of the country, controlled the transgressions of the king and the courtiers, and blocked their extremities. The kings also accepted the authority of the religious authorities and limited themselves; this was a great achievement per se" (Ḥasanī, 2002: 26).

Could we find a license for the acceptance of suchlike guardianship? We will examine the viewpoints and opinions of the Shī'a and Sunnī exegetes and jurists to evaluate the acceptance licenses.

The viewpoints of the Shī'a jurists and exegetes

In his interpretation of the noble verse "(Joseph) said: 'Set me over the storehouses of the land: I will indeed guard them, as one that knows (their importance)'", Ṭabrisī says, "... Based on the content of the verse, the acceptance of guardianship from a tyrant ruler is permissible provided that it is used to restore the right of a rightful" (Ṭabrisī, 1983, vol. 6: 153).

Affirming the foregoing reason, he relates the acceptance license to the quality of Prophet Joseph (a) as a Prophet and Imām and his special knowledge, and says, "... Since he is a prophet and Imām and has special knowledge and no one else has this quality, he has the ability to do things that have been given to him" (Ibid., vol. 5: 373; id., 1998, vol. 2: 253).

Ḥusaynī Jurjānī says in this regard, "His assertion 'I will indeed guard them, as one that knows' refers to the point that the condition for ruling is that the ruler is just and knowledgeable so that he does not commit any disloyalty and mistake. As a result, some jurists have used this verse to rule for the permissibility of asking for governance and judgment from a tyrant ruler provided that he is just, religious, and not harmful, and if these conditions are not met, it is not permissible. Therefore, its acquisition based on these words is not perfectly sound (and it is not hidden that) although the implication of the aforementioned verse for these decrees is not direct, such

an implication can be perceived using the external indications” (Ḥusaynī Jurjānī, 1984, vol. 2: 121).

Fayḍ Kāshānī writes, “... The intention with the word *ḥifẓ* is the protection of properties from betrayal. It has been narrated from Imām Ṣādiq (a) in *‘Ilal al-sharāyī’* and from Imām Riḍā (a) in *‘Uyūn* and *‘Ayyāshī* about the meaning of this verse: ‘I am the guardian of the property under my supervision and I know every language; the acceptance of guardianship is to sign the divine decrees, promote the right, and enforce the rights’” (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1994, vol. 4: 24; id., 1997, vol. 2: 139).

In the interpretation of the aforementioned verse related to the acceptance of guardianship from a tyrant ruler, ‘Arūsī Ḥuwayzī presents narrations from the book *‘Ilal al-sharāyī’* and *‘Uyūn al-akhbār* and analyzes the reason for the decree. This takes him to introduce compulsion as the reason for the acceptance of this decree (‘Arūsī Ḥuwayzī, 1994, vol. 3: 483).

Some other exegetes have referred to the same reason in their interpretation of this verse (Quṭb al-Dīn Rāwandī, 1985, vol. 2: 19 & 25; Kāshānī, 2002, vol. 3: 382).

Within his quotation of a narration, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī expresses the reason for the acceptance of such a guardianship by Imām Riḍā (a) as follows:

It has been narrated in the book *‘Uyūn* from *‘Ayyāshī*: Muḥammad b. Naṣr has narrated from Ḥasan b. Mūsā: Our companions have narrated from Imām Riḍā (a) that some people who were not familiar with Islamic standards sometimes criticized Imām for his acceptance of the position of the successor to the caliphate despite all his piety and disregard for the mundane life. Imām answered, “Is a prophet superior or the trustee of a prophet?” They said, “No, the prophet is superior”. He said, “Which one is superior: a Muslim or a polytheist?” They said, “The Muslim”. He said, “The captain of Pharaoh's guard was a polytheist but Joseph was a prophet, and Ma’mūn is (seemingly) a Muslim and I am the trustee of the Prophet (s). Joseph asked the captain to appoint him as the guardian of the Egypt’s treasures and told him, ‘I will indeed guard them, as one that knows’. But I had to accept this position (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1996, vol. 11: 110).

We read in *Tafsīr Nimūna* about how Joseph accepted the offer of the tyrant ruler of his era: the first thing that grabs our attention in the foregoing verses is that why did Joseph – this great prophet – accept to become the treasurer or prime minister of one of the tyrant rulers of his era and cooperate with him?

The answer to this question is in fact hidden in the same foregoing verses. He took this position as a protector and knowledgeable person (guardian and

aware) so as to guard the public treasury for people – which in fact belonged to people – and use it for their interests, especially deliver the right of the weak and oppressed which is usually violated in societies.

Moreover, (as we said) he knew through his interpretation knowledge that a harsh economic crisis was about to happen to the Egyptian nation which would lead to the death of many people if no precise planning and close supervision was done. Therefore, saving a nation and protecting the lives of innocent people required Joseph to use that opportunity for the interest of all people – especially the deprived ones – because in an economic crises and famine, it is the lives of the deprived people that are endangered first and they are the first victims of the crises (Makārim Shīrāzī, 1992, vol. 10: 7).

In the light of the scope of the discussion and the related narrations, what is for sure here is that accepting the guardianship by Prophet Joseph (a) or Imām Riḍā (a) are just evident instances of this issue, while the linguistic context of the verse clearly indicates the permissibility of the acceptance of a guardianship through which the person can address various issues and solve people's problems. It is noted in the jurisprudential discussions of *Makāsib muḥarrama* on “the acceptance of guardianship from a tyrant ruler” that the acceptance of a position offered by a tyrant ruler is not always illicit, but is sometimes recommended and even obligatory when the advantages of its acceptance and its religious priorities are more than the disadvantages resulting from the empowerment of the government.

The late Shaykh Anṣārī (may God have mercy on him) writes in his *Makāsib* about the licenses of guardianship,

“Two issues are licenses for accepting guardianship: one of them is standing for the interests of people on which all jurists have a consensus and there is no disagreement on the ruling that one can accept guardianship offered by a tyrant ruler, provided that he can restore the right of the rightful” (Anṣārī, 1995, vol. 2: 56).

This decree is issued relying on consensus, authoritative sunna, and the noble verse “(Joseph) said: ‘Set me over the store-houses of the land’”. Based on this verse, Prophet Joseph (a) asked the king of Egypt to set him as the one in charge of financial affairs. Undoubtedly, this position should have been conveyed by the tyrant ruler and if this is an illicit and hated issue, the sacred and infallible self of Prophet Joseph (a) should not have asked for it.

The second license for accepting the guardianship is that this acceptance can be used for the promotion of good and prevention of evil as an introductory to an obligatory act: “It is obligatory to undertake any introductory act on which an obligation depends and with regard to which the responsible person has the ability” (ibid.).

We can also see in numerous narrations that the Pure Imāms (a) have given such a license to some of their close friend such as ‘Alī b. Yaḡṡīn who was a companion of Imām Kāzīm (a) and accepted to be the minister of Hārūn al-Rashīd with the permission of Imām (Qumī, n.d., vol. 2: 252).

At any rate, the acceptance or rejection of suchlike positions depends on “the important and more important” principle and its social and religious advantages and disadvantages should be assessed. Maybe a person who accepts such a position finally dethrones the tyrant ruler – as (according to some narrations) happened in the story of Joseph (a) – or becomes the source of later uprisings and revolutions when he sets the ground for revolution from within the political system – an example might be the Mu’min Āl Fir‘awn – or at least becomes a refuge for the oppressed and the deprived and can decrease the governmental pressure on them. Each of these issues can be a license for the acceptance of suchlike positions.

In the narration collections, too, compulsion is introduced as the cause of the issuance of the acceptance license. For example, a famous narration from Imām Ṣādiq (a) about suchlike people which reads, “The expiation for cooperation with tyrant governments is the satisfaction of others’ needs” refers to this stance (Ḥurr ‘Āmilī, 1988, vol. 12: 139, vol. 17: 203; Ṣadūq, 1944: 68).

The Sunnī scholars’ viewpoints

In the words of some Sunnī exegetes, there is a reference to the *wikālat* (representativeness) of Prophet Joseph (a): “I will guard whatever I have accepted its representation, and I know all languages”.

There are many differences between *wikālat* and the Infallibles’ *wilāyat*.

“*Wikālat* and *niyābat* (deputyship) are arbitrary issues. However, *wilāyat* has a difference with and advantage over these two which makes clear the difference between a *wilāyat*-based state and other states.

In *niyābat* and *wikālat*, the client and represented body are primary and the deputy and representative are secondary, while in *wilāyat*, the guardian is primary and the ward is secondary, because in *niyābat*, the deputy represents the client and in *wikālat*, the representative represents the represented body. However, in *wilāyat*, there is no degradation, because the guardian is primary himself and so, he does not do the represented body’s task instead of him; rather, he does it independently and so, even if he wants to declare his intention, he does not declare it on behalf of the represented body because he has *wilāyat* himself and so, declares his own intention” (Jawādī Āmulī, 1988: 97).

Therefore, the performance of the divine guardian will be different if the act itself is *wikālat* or *wilāyat*, because the prophet and Imām are the only

representatives of the wise sovereignty of God. They are the primary rulers in the system of universe, and in fact it is their divine right to have all state affairs in their hands and found the Islamic state rather than to be under the command of another person and do things as the deputy of the tyrant ruler. On the other hand, wilāyat cannot be deposed and the vicegerent of the divine guardian after his demise is another prophet or Imām, while wikālat is exterminated when the represented body dies.

The verse refers to wikālat in the eyes of some Sunnī exegetes and jurists, and to wilāyat in the words of majority of them.

Samarqandī writes, “Joseph (a) told ‘Set me in charge of the national treasure and I will supervise its management’. And it is said that he asserted, ‘I will protect what I have accepted to represent, and I know all languages’. In still another work, it is said that he noted, ‘I will take care so that everything is placed in its right place’. He did this for the interest of the people, because he knew that no one could do this at his performance level. Some take the phrase Ḥafīzun ‘alīm (I will indeed guard them, as one that knows) to mean the knowledge of the famine time” (Samarqandī, 1995, vol. 2: 198).

Ṭabarī writes: Joseph (a) asked the king to delegate issues related to the national welfare and tax to him. The king accepted this request and delegated the internal affairs and judgment to him. Of course, interpretations about the word “ḥafīz” are different. Some have taken it to regard food, and some have said that it might mean “I will guard the property entrusted to me and I have the knowledge to supervise the affairs delegated to me” (Ṭabarī, 1991, vol. 13: 5).

In line with affirming Ṭabarī’s opinion, Ibn Abī Ḥātam writes: Ibn Ishāq has narrated Ibn Zayd who said that the king had a lot of non-food sources. He delegated the management of all of them to Joseph and granted him the right to judge (Ibn Abī Ḥātam, 1998, vol. 7: 2160).

Ibn Jawzi writes: There are two stances toward the meaning of “treasures”: the property treasures (as Ḍaḥāk and Zajāj believe), and the food sources (as Ibn Sā’ib asserts).

Zajāj said: Joseph’s request was because of the fact that prophets are appointed to implement justice, and he knew that no one could do this like him.

However, he sets forth three opinions with regard to the phrase “ḥafīzun ‘alīm” (guarding and knowledgeable): Ḥafīz about the supervision of affairs and ‘alīm about the famine time (the view narrated from Ibn ‘Abbās by Abū Ṣāliḥ); ḥafīz with regard to trustiness and ‘alīm about the famine years (the

view taken by Ḥasan); and ḥafīz with regard to accounts and ‘alīm about the languages (which is Suddī’s viewpoint) (Ibn Jawzī, 2001, vol. 2: 450).

Ibn ‘Arabī says: There is a discussion on why Joseph asked for ruling and wilāyat while the noble Prophet (s) told Samura: Do not ask for ruling, because if you ask for such a thing, you become their representative and if you don’t accept you do not help them. The Prophet continued: We do not make anyone commanding our practice.

There is a reference to wikālat in this statement. However, the question on the reason Joseph accepted the ruling was to restore the rights of the poor and the fact that no one could perform that undertaking like him.

However, it can be asked that why the believer prophet has asked a tyrant ruler for wilāyat? It should be said that Joseph did not ask for ruling; rather he wanted to empty (the position of wilāyat from a disbeliever) and deliver it to himself. Prophets treat the rulers and kings sometimes forcefully and sometimes with diplomacy (Ibn ‘Arabī, 2001, vol. 3: 1091).

Qurṭabī and Fakhr Rāzī have also referred to this theme (Qurṭabī, 1985, vol. 9: 211; Fakhr Rāzī, 1999, vol. 18: 128 & vol. 1: 253).

Ibn Jazī refers to another aspect of this request and writes: The request for wilāyat has been for the execution of justice, enforcement of right, and benevolence (as the king was a disbeliever). As a result, some have argued that a virtuous person can work for an impious person if he can reform the affairs by this means (Ibn Jazī, 1995, vol. 1: 390).

In addition to the aforementioned issues, Ālūsī writes: This request will get obligatory if he can enforce a ritual obligation through it, and then it will be incumbent upon him (Ālūsī, 1994, vol. 13: 5 & vol. 9: 53).

Ḥaqqī Burūsawī states that the reason for the acceptance of suchlike wilāyat is to execute justice and rules of Law, and asserts that it is a heavy duty. He says that if a person can reform the system of universe by this means, he is required to accept suchlike wilāyat. Moreover, the foregoing verse implies the permissibility of accepting from the disbeliever and the tyrant ruler, when he knows that there is no other way to execute the divine decrees, remove the wrong, and enforce the right; therefore, if such a guardianship is determined for a person, its acceptance is a general obligation and he has to accept it (Ḥaqqī Burūsawī, 1985, vol. 4: 279).

Zuḥaylī writes that since Joseph saved the country from famine, the King accepted his request and made him the secretary of treasury (due to the goodness he saw in Joseph) (Zuḥaylī, 1997, vol. 2: 94 & 116).

Mazharī asserts the same idea using a different language: Joseph described himself as having trustiness and competence, and asked the king for wilāyat so as to execute the divine decrees, enforce the right, and

promote justice, and these are the things for which the prophets are appointed (Maḏharī, 1991, vol. 1: 333).

Abū Ḥayyān Andulusī (Abū Ḥayyān Andulusī, 1999, vol. 5: 318), Bayḏāwī (Bayḏāwī, 1997, vol. 3: 295), Tha‘ālibī (Tha‘ālibī, 1997, vol. 3: 333), Khāzin (Khāzin, 1938, vol. 3: 292), and Zamakhsharī (Zamakhsharī, 1986, vol. 2: 482) have also referred to this point.

The examination of the words of this group of jurists and exegetes reveals various decrees, including the permissibility of the acceptance, obligation, or general obligation of it in order to enforce the right and execute the justice.

Conclusion

The ultimate outcome of this study can be summarized as follows.

1. Under the interpretation of the verse “(Joseph) said: ‘Set me over the store-houses of the land’”, The Shī‘a and Sunnī exegetes have deemed the license for the acceptance of the public positions in the tyrant governments to be conditioned to the restoration of right and its promotion as well as the enforcement of justice. The difference between the two denominations here is that the Shī‘a jurists introduce the acceptance of suchlike wilāyat to be in the light of the special knowledge of the prophet and Imām (a) and the role of compulsion in the acceptance of the Infallible (a) and have stipulated this stance in their words, while some Sunnī jurists have suggested wikālat issue and another group of them has stressed the competence and trustiness of Prophet Joseph (a) and have come to believe in its permissibility, obligation, or general obligation.

2. Due to the differences in the viewpoints, the most general understanding can be that no matter if we take the acceptance of guardianship from a tyrant ruler supported by the knowledge of prophet and Imām (a), their wikālat, or their trustiness and competence, the necessity of accepting this type of guardianship in order to solve the problems of the Islamic society, help Muslims, and undertake the promotion of good and prevent of evil is extremely evident.

3. The important point is the jurists’ use of one of the Anecdote Verses of the Qur’ān which is not considered to be among the famous Verses of the Revealed Prescripts. This indicates that the extracted decree is still true due to the Iṣṭishāb principle (presumed continuity of laws) and the lack of abrogation of the rules of previous nations and the continuation and applicability of them in the following religions.

References

Noble Qur'ān

Nahj al-balāgha (1988). Edited by Kāḍim Muḥammadī & Muḥammad Dashṭī, Qom, Imām 'Alī (a) Publications.

Abū Ḥayyān Andalusī, M. (1999), *Tafsīr al-baḥr al-muḥīṭ*. Beirut, Dār al-Fikr.

Ālūsī, M. (1994), *Tafsīr Rūḥ al-ma'ānī*. Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya.

Anṣārī, M. (1995), *Al-Makāsib al-muḥarrama*. Qom, Dār al-Ḥikma Publications.

'Arūsī Ḥuwazī, A. (1994), *Tafsīr nūr al-thaqalayn*. Qom, Islmā'iliyān Publications.

Badāwī, N. (1997), *Anwār al-tanzīl wa asrār al-ta'wīl*. Beirut, Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī.

Fakhr Rāzī, A. (1999), *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*. Beirut, Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī.

Fayḍ Kāshānī, M. (1994), *Tafsīr al-ṣāfi*. Tehran, Al-Ṣadr Publications.

----- (1997), *Al-Aṣfā fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. Qom, Islamic Guidance Office Publications.

Ḥaqqī Burūsawī, A. (1985), *Tafsīr rūḥ al-bayān*. Beirut, Dār al-Fikr.

Ḥasanī, A. (2002), "An jurisprudential examination of cooperation with rulers and kings". *Maktab Islam Magazine*, 29(3), 24-31.

Hurr 'Āmilī, M. (1988), *Wasā'il al-Shī'a*. Qom, Āl al-Bayt Institute.

Ḥusayni Jurjānī, A. (1984), *Āyāt al-aḥkām*. Tehran, Nawīd Publications.

Ibn Abī Ḥātam, A. (1998), *Tafsīr Ibn Abī Ḥātam*. Riyadh, Maktabat Nazār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz.

Ibn 'Arabī, A. (2001), *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Beirut, Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī.

Ibn Fāris, A. (1984), *Mu'jam maqā'īs al-lughā*. Qom, Maktab al-A'lām al-Islāmī Publications.

Ibn Jawzī, A. (2001), *Zād al-masīr fī 'ilm al-tafsīr*. Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabī.

Ibn Jazī, M. (1995), *Al-Tashīl*. Beirut, Shirkat Dār al-Arqam Ibn Abī al-Arqam.

Īrawānī Najafī, M. (1959), *Hāshiya al-Makāsib*. Tehran, Rushdiyya Publications.

Jawādī Āmulī, A. (2002), *Jurist guardianship: The guardianship of jurisprudence and justice*. Qom, Isrā' Publications.

----- (1988), *Jurist guardianship: Leadership in Islam*. Qom, Isrā' Publications.

Kāshānī, F. (2002), *Zubda al-tafāsīr*. Qom, Islamic Knowledge Foundation.

- Khāzin, A. (1938), *Lubāb al-ta'wīl fī ma'ānī al-tanzīl*. Cairo, Al-Maktabat al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā.
- Khu'ī, A. (1999), *Miṣbāh al-fiqāha*. Qom, Mu'assisa al-Nashr al-Islāmī.
- Khumeinī, R. (1978), *Makāsib muḥarrama*. Tehran, Institute for the Arrangement and Publication of Imām Khumeinī's Works.
- Khūrī Shartūnī, S. (1983), *Aqrab al-mawārid*. Qom, Āyatullāh Mar'ashī Najafī Library.
- Makārim Shīrāzī, N. (1992), *Tafsīr nimūna*. Tehran, Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya.
- Mazharī, M. (1991), *Al-Tafsīr al-mazharī*. Islām Ābād, Maktabat Rushdiyya.
- Qāsimī, M. (2011), "An Inquiry into the tradition: Definitely, people should have a ruler, whether righteous or dissolute". *Ma'rifat-i Syāsī*, 3(2), 73-100.
- Qumī, A. (n.d.), *Safīna al-bihār*. Beirut, Dār al-Ta'āruf lil-Maṭbū'āt.
- Qurashī, A. (1973), *Qāmūs Qur'ān*. Tehran, Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya.
- Qurṭabī, M. (1985), *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Tehran, Nāṣir Khusru Publications.
- Quṭb al-Dīn Rāwandī, S. (1985), *Fiqh al-Qur'ān fī sharḥ Āyāt al-aḥkām*. Qom, Āyatullāh Mar'ashī Najafī Library.
- Rāghib Iṣfahānī, M. (1972), *Mu'jam mufradāt alfāz al-Qur'ān*. Tehran, Al-Maktabat al-Murtaḍawiyya.
- Ṣadūq, M. (1944), *Amālī*. Tehran, Islamic Library Publications.
- Samarqandī, N. (1995), *Tafsīr baḥr al-'ulūm*. Beirut, Dār al-Fikr.
- Shakūrī, A. (1982), *Political jurisprudence of Islam*. Qom, Ḥurr Publications.
- Ṭabarī, A. (1991), *Jāmi' al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. Beirut, Dār al-Ma'rifa.
- Ṭabāṭabā'ī, M. (1996), *Al-Mizān*. Qom, Islamic Publications Office.
- Ṭabrisī, F. (1998), *Tafsīr jawāmi' al-jāmi'*. Tehran, University of Tehran Publications.
- (1983), *Majma' al-bayān*. Qom, Āyatullāh al-'Uzmā al-Mara'shī Library.
- Tha'ālibī, A. (1997), *Jawāhir al-ḥisān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. Beirut, Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī.
- Ṭurayḥī, F. (1966), *Majma' al-baḥrayn*. Tehran, Al-Maktabat al-Murtaḍawiyya.
- Zamakhsharī, M. (1986), *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl*. Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī.
- Zuḥaylī, W. (1997), *Al-Tafsīr al-munīr fī al-'aqīda wa al-sharī'a*. Beirut, Dār al-Fikr.