The rule of al-ʿibra bi-ʿumūm al-lafẓ lā bi-khuṣūṣ al-sabab (consideration is given to the generality of the wording, not the specificity of the occasion) is one of the established pillars of Qur’anic exegesis and juristic derivation, prioritizing the universal implication of the wording over the historical occasion of revelation. This study employs an analytical–descriptive method with a comparative approach to examine the evidentiary structure, theoretical foundations, and scope of validity of this rule within the intellectual framework of contemporary exegetes and Qur’anic scholars. The findings indicate that among Imami (Shiʿi) scholars, this rule is accepted as a definitive principle based on four categories of evidence: rational (the universality and wisdom of legislation), transmitted (the practice of the Infallibles in applying Qur’anic verses), linguistic (the apparent meaning inherent in general expressions), and consensus (ijmāʿ). Philosophical and mystical elaborations—such as those advanced by Jawādī Āmulī—have further strengthened its theoretical underpinnings. In the Sunni tradition, the rule is likewise recognized as valid by classical legal theorists and exegetes; however, some contemporary intellectual currents, through an excessive emphasis on textual historicity or ideologically driven readings, in practice limit or distort its scope of application. Ultimately, this article demonstrates the the effectiveness of thi